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**SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis

20 August 1995

Iraq: Implications of the Husayn Kamil Defection

Baghdad is downplaying the significance of Husayn Kamil's departure and adopting a conciliatory attitude toward the UN and Jordan to surmount the initial crisis. Nevertheless, the regime faces three major challenges in the wake of the defection: bloody feuding within Saddam's immediate family, revelations by Husayn Kamil concerning weapons programs, and uncertainty over Iraq's crucial relationship with Jordan.

Strife Within the Inner Circle

Husayn Kamil defected at least in part because he rejected the growing power of Saddam's eldest son Uday, whose ambition, jealousy, and irresponsibility have torn the family into bitter factions. In addition to the departure of Husayn Kamil and his brother Saddam Kamil--who were among the most prominent of Saddam's paternal relatives--deep rifts have developed between Uday and Saddam's maternal half-brothers, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN in Geneva Barzan al-Tikriti and former Interior Minister Watban al-Tikriti.

Problems created by Uday within Saddam's family--which is Iraq's de facto ruling body--potentially threaten the regime's stability and ability to govern.

- Unless Saddam takes steps to inhibit his son's power, resentment of Uday may foment coup plotting among family members and within the military and security services.

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- Rising paranoia within the shrinking inner circle is likely to lead to appointments based more on loyalty than on talent and to less rational domestic and foreign policies.
- Husayn Kamil's defection revealed the extent of the ruling family's troubles to the average Iraqi. The public probably perceives that the regime is growing weaker, as reflected by a drop in the value of the Iraqi dinar to an all-time low of 3,000 to \$1 on Baghdad's black market before rebounding to 1,850 to \$1 [redacted]

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Mixed Prospects on Weapons Disclosures

Husayn Kamil's defection could be either a breakthrough or a setback for Iraq's efforts to get UN sanctions eased.

- The defection has forced Baghdad to provide new data in anticipation of revelations by Husayn Kamil and to back off from its late-August deadline for UNSCOM Chairman Ekeus to certify full compliance. If Saddam authorizes a full disclosure and refrains from deadlines--which have hurt Iraq's standing in the Security Council--Ekeus could complete his work in time for the November sanctions review.
- However, Iraq's long record of deception suggests that even the defection of its top WMD official will not elicit a full disclosure. Baghdad may provide only part of the outstanding data, claiming that any remaining gaps are based on false accounts by Husayn Kamil to discredit the regime. Under these circumstances, the impasse with Ekeus would resume. [redacted]

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Ekeus has publicly stated that his visit to Baghdad on 18-20 August yielded important new information on Iraq's BW and missile programs, but that more data is necessary. Ekeus's scheduled 21 August meeting with Husayn Kamil--who has told US officials that Iraq weaponized CW and BW agents contrary to its UN testimony--will provide an initial test of the thoroughness of Baghdad's revelations. [redacted]

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The Jordan Dilemma

The defections by the Kamil brothers and Saddam's two daughters to Jordan have cast uncertainty over the course of Iraq's most important relationship.

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- King Hussein's decision to grant asylum to the defectors signals a shift toward Iraq's arch-enemies Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. His rebuffing of Saddam's emissaries and authorization of joint military exercises with US forces have caused Saddam to lose face.
- However, Iraq's almost complete dependence on Jordan as an outlet for international trade, banking, and transportation has prevented Baghdad from taking hostile action against Amman. [redacted]

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For now, popular support for Iraq in Jordan appears to be inhibiting further steps by King Hussein to move closer to the Gulf countries by shedding ties to Iraq. Baghdad is likely to maintain its conciliatory approach to Jordan even if full diplomatic ties are restored with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

- Iraqi Information Minister Hammadi told reporters on 20 August that Baghdad does not object to improved relations between Jordan and the Gulf states as long as such a move is not made at the expense of ties with Iraq. [redacted]

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This report was prepared by [redacted] Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was coordinated within the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, [redacted] NESA, on [redacted] secure, or [redacted] STU III. (U)

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
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